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THIS article discusses judicial developments relating to the Texaslaw of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other es-tate planning matt rs during the Survey period of November 1,
2011 through October 31, 2012. The reader is warned that not all newly
decided cases during the Survey period are presented, and not all aspects
of each cited case are analyzed. You must read and study the full text of
each opinion before relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion
of most cases includes a moral-that is, an important lesson-to be
learned from the case. By recognizing situations that have resulted in
time consuming and costly litigation in the past, the reader may be able to
reduce the likelihood of the same situations arising with his or her clients.
Although the Texas Legislature was not in session during the Survey
period, it is important to mention a significant change on the horizon. The
2009 legislature began the process of codifying the current Probate Code
into the new Estates Code. It is interesting to note that although called a
"code," the Probate Code is not a true "code" because it was enacted in
1955, which was before the 1963 Legislature began the process of codify-
ing Texas law into 27 codes. The codification process is supposed to be
nonsubstantive.
The portion of the Estates Code passed by the 2009 legislature focuses
on intestacy, wills, and estate administration.' The guardianship and dura-
ble power of attorney provisions were added in 2011.2 The 2011 legisla-
ture also made changes to the previously enacted portions of the Estates
Code to be consistent with amendments it made to the existing Probate
Code.3 The 2013 Legislature made both nonsubstantive corrections and
substantive changes to the Estates Code.4 The entire Estates Code is
1. See, e.g., Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512;
Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 4273.
2. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 823, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1901,
1901; Act of May 29, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1338, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3882, 3882-83.
3. Act of April 30, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 42, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 54, 84-88;
Act of May 9, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 161, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 623, 623-57; Act of
May 17, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 351, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1123, 1123-24; Act of May
17, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 780, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1995, 1995-96; Act of May 21,
2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 647, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1733, 1734; Act of May 22, 2013,
83d Leg., R.S., ch. 684, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1784, 1784-85; Act of May 22, 2013, 83d
Leg., R.S., ch. 671, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1764, 1764-68; Act of May 22, 2013, 83d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 689, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1793, 1793; Act of May 22, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch.
700, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1819, 1819-22; Act of May 24, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 982,
2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2388, 2388-99; Act of May 24, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, 2013
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2740, 2740-56. See generally Act of May 5, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 91,
§§ 8.001-26, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 448, 457; Act of May 19, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 823,
2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1901; Act of May 25, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 810, 2011 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1875; Act of May 29, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1338, § 2.54, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3882,
3933.
4. Act of April 30, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 42, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 54, 84-88;
Act of May 9, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 161, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 623, 623-57; Act of
May 17, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 351, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1123, 1123-24; Act of May
17, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 780, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1995, 1995-96; Act of May 21,
2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 647, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1733, 1734; Act of May 22, 2013,
83d Leg., R.S., ch. 684, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1784, 1784-85; Act of May 22, 2013, 83d
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slated to become effective on January 1, 2014.5
I. INTESTACY
Although most Texans die intestate,6 intestacy issues do not generate
significant appellate activity. Thus, there are no opinions dealing with de-
scent and distribution issues to report.
II. WILLS
A. FORMALrTIES
In In re Estate of Arrington, the Houston First Court of Appeals deter-
mined that it lacks the power to require that the witnesses read a will and
that the testator sign each page of the will.7 In this case, the testator exe-
cuted a will two days after being diagnosed with an inoperable brain tu-
mor.8 His will left his entire estate to one of his daughters to the exclusion
of his other children and his wife from whom he was in the process of
getting a divorce. The trial court admitted the will to probate.9 The testa-
tor's wife appealed claiming that there was no evidence to support the
jury's findings that the testator properly executed the will and had testa-
mentary capacity.20
The court of appeals rejected the wife's claim that the testator did not
properly execute his will." She argued that the will was invalid because
the testator did not sign each page and because the witnesses did not read
the will.12 The court explained that neither of these two steps are re-
Leg., R.S., ch. 671, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1764, 1764-68; Act of May 22, 2013, 83d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 689, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1793, 1793; Act of May 22, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch.
700, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1819, 1819-22; Act of May 24, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 982,
2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2388, 2388-99; Act of May 24, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1136, 2013
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2740, 2740-56.
5. Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, § 12, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512,1732;
Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, §§ 13-14, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1473; Act of
May 5, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 91, § 8.026, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 445, 463; Act of May 19,
2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 823, § 4.03, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1901, 2095; Act of May 23, 2011,
82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1338, § 2.55, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3882, 3939; Act of May 25, 2011, 82d
Leg., R.S., ch. 810, § 2.18, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1875, 1882.
6. See, e.g., Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of
Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 882 (2012) ("[M]ost individuals allow the default rules of
intestacy to govern the disposition of their property at death."); ABA, Where There's a
Will, There's a Way, YOUR LAW, Spring 1988, at 3 (stating seventy percent of individuals do
not have wills); Isn't it Time You Wrote a Will?, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1985, at 103
("[Miore than two-thirds of all adult Americans die without wills."); EUGENE F. SCOLES &
EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND
TRUSTS 13 (4th ed. 1987) ("Despite the reasons for disposing of one's property by will or
even by trust, most Americans die intestate.").
7. In re Estate of Arrington, 365 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, no pet.).
8. Id. at 465.
9. Id. at 466.
10. For a discussion of the testamentary capacity issues raised by this case, see infra
Part II.C.3.




quired under Probate Code § 59 and that it was powerless to add to the
requirements set forth by the Texas legislature.13
B. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
1. Debts "Paid Out of My Estate"
In In re Estate of Anderegg, both the trial court and the El Paso Court
of Appeals held that the statement "all of my just debts and all expenses
of my last illness, funeral, and the administration of my estate shall be
paid out of my estate" was sufficient to alter the statutory abatement or-
der provided in Texas Probate Code § 322B.14 Thus, the testator's debts
are to be paid pro rata from all estate property.
The first section of the testator's will contained the statement requiring
debts to be paid by the estate.15 The second section of the testator's will
contained the dispositive provisions and opened with the words "[s]ubject
to the provisions of the foregoing paragraph hereof, I do hereby give and
bequeath .".. ."16 The last paragraph in section two gave "[a]ll the rest
and residue" to two beneficiaries. The last paragraph in the section spe-
cifically mentioned 115 acres of real property in Kimble County, Texas.' 7
The court of appeals explained that the will expressed an intent to deviate
from the statutory abatement order based on the language in the first
section alone because Probate Code § 3(1) "defines 'estate' as the real
and personal property of the decedent."18 The court of appeals stated in
footnote 2 that "[i]t could be argued that the instruction to pay debts and
expenses out of the estate is too general to alter the statutory abatement
order"; however, the two beneficiaries erroneously believed that they
would fare better under the statutory order because they were given the
residuary estate rather than a specific devise of real property.19
The holding in this case may lead to unexpected results because many
wills contain boilerplate language requiring debts and expenses to be paid
out of the estate. This case now acts as authority that this language is
sufficient to trump the normal abatement order. Accordingly, every will
should contain an express statement describing how the testator wants
debts and expenses to be paid, for example, via the statutory order, pro
rata, or in some other way.
2. "All Monies"
The testator's will being litigated in In re Estate of Anderegg stated that
the beneficiary was to receive "all monies I may have at the time of my
death, be they in the form of cash, checking accounts or savings accounts,
13. Id.
14. In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 679.
18. Id. (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(1) (West Supp. 2011).
19. Id. at 679 n.2.
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all stocks, bonds, annuities, etc., and any accounts I may have with
[named institutions] or others." 20 Both the trial court and the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that the beneficiary was entitled to a lump sum
death benefit and an income tax refund.21 The court of appeals explained
that the death benefit and tax refund were relatively liquid financial as-
sets of the same basic type described.22 The court found it significant that
the testator included the abbreviation "etc." in the list, meaning that ad-
ditional, unspecified similar items were to be included in the gift, and that
the list was not meant to be exclusive (expressio unius est exclusio alter-
ius). 2 3 The court based its reasoning on a 1971 Texas Supreme Court case
and stated "'money' is a word 'of flexible meaning that ordinarily refers
to cash or coin, but it has often been construed in will cases to mean
wealth or property." 24 Because attempts to define a gift of money and
similar items are fraught with interpretation problems, the drafting attor-
ney must exercise great care or consider a different way of achieving the
client's goal, such as naming pay on death payees.
3. Distribution Provisions
In Nash v. Beckett, the parents created two trusts, one for each of their
children.25 Upon the death of the last child, the property was to be dis-
tributed to their descendants equally. 26 The trial court held that the re-
mainder of each child's trust passed only to that child's descendants. 27
The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that each descendant
is entitled to an equal share of both trusts. 28
The court of appeals focused on the unambiguous language of the
trusts, which said that upon termination, the trust is to "be divided into as
many equal shares as there are children of my two sons surviving, to-
gether with an equal share per stirpes for the surviving child or children
of any deceased grandchild." 29 The court found additional support for
this argument in that the trusts did not terminate until the last child
died.30 If the balance of each trust would pass only to the descendants of
the child for whom the trust was created, there would be no reason to
delay distribution until the other child died.31 Accordingly, the trust's
terms could not logically be read to give the balance of each trust only to
the descendants of the child for whom that trust was originally created. 32
20. Id. at 678-79.
21. Id. at 680.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 681.
24. Id. at 680 (quoting Stewart v. Selder, 473 S.W.2d 3, 9 (Tex. 1971)).
25. Nash v. Beckett, 365 S.W.3d 131, 133-34 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2012, pet.
denied).
26. Id. at 134.
27. Id. at 136 & n.8.
28. Id. at 141.
29. Id. at 138.





The court recognized that the rule against perpetuities' savings clause
would have yielded this result, but this clause was not the cause of the
trusts terminating.33 Also, the fact that a child could exercise a power of
appointment over trust property that would pass to his descendants did
not mean that the entire trust corpus would pass only to his
descendants. 34
The provisions under dispute in this case appear to have been expertly
drafted. Thus, the lesson to be learned is that no matter how well-drafted
a provision may be, someone who is unhappy with the resulting disposi-
tion may assert that the provision does not mean what it clearly states.
C. CoNTESTS
1. Sufficiency of General Denial
A general denial of a will-proponent's application to probate a will may
qualify as a contest of the will, as demonstrated by In re Estate of Hud-
son.35 The testator's son filed a general denial when his mother applied to
probate his father's will.3 6 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that this
general denial was sufficient as a contest under Probate Code § 10, and
thus the son was entitled to be heard during the probate of the will and
have his request for a jury trial honored under Probate Code § 21.37 The
court noted that Probate Code § 10 does not require that a will contestant
identify with specificity the grounds on which the contestant is opposing
the will.38
2. Discovery
In re ChesseS39 shows that courts are willing to permit access to certain
confidential material if necessary to administer justice. The contestant of
the testator's will sought disclosure of the testator's Adult Protective Ser-
vices (APS) file and the right to depose the APS caseworker. 40 The trial
court denied the request and the contestant sought a writ of mandamus.41
The El Paso Court of Appeals conditionally granted the writ, determining
that the APS file and caseworker testimony were essential to the adminis-
tration of justice.42
33. Id. at 141.
34. Id. at 139-40.
35. In re Estate of Hudson, No. 05-11-00008-CV, 2011 WL 5433689, at *4 (Tex. App.-
Dallas Nov. 10, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
36. Id. at *1.
37. Id. at *4.
38. Id. at *3-4.
39. In re Chesses, 388 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.).
40. Id. at 331.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 343.
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3. Lack of Testamentary Capacity
In the case of In re Estate of Arrington,43 two days after being diag-
nosed with an inoperable brain tumor, the testator declared a will that
left his entire estate to his daughter to the exclusion of his other children
and his wife, from whom he was in the process of getting a divorce.44 The
trial court admitted the will to probate.45 The testator's wife appealed
claiming that there was no evidence to support the jury's findings that the
testator properly executed the will and had testamentary capacity.46
The Houston First Court of Appeals rejected the wife's claim that the
testator lacked testamentary capacity. 47 The court explained that the jury
heard direct evidence of the testator's capacity on the date of will execu-
tion from the subscribing witnesses, one of whom had known the testator
for twenty years. 48 The court rejected the wife's claim that the testator
lacked capacity because the will named a person as a child who was never
legally adopted and omitted an alleged additional child.49 As the court
stated, "a finding of testamentary capacity does not hinge entirely on di-
rect evidence that the testator discussed the details of his children,
wealth, or disposition at the time he signed his will." 50 As a practical mat-
ter, of course, family descriptions in wills should be accurate to help pre-
vent attacks on the will based on lack of testamentary capacity.
Le v. Nguyen5 shows that a will proponent will have a difficult time
overturning a jury finding that a testator lacked testamentary capacity
and that, accordingly, a proponent needs to present the jury with convinc-
ing evidence that the testator possessed testamentary capacity. The testa-
tor executed a will on December 1, 2009, at which time his capacity was
not challenged. 52 The testator's condition deteriorated rapidly, and later
in the month an attorney met with the testator to discuss the changes he
wanted to make to his will.5 3 The attorney returned several times to have
the testator sign the new will, but the testator was unable to sign.54 At the
end of his last visit on December 31, the attorney left the will with the
testator's fianc6e.55 Later that evening, the testator executed the will in
front of two witnesses.56
43. In re Estate of Arrington, 365 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
no pet.).
44. Id. at 465.
45. Id. at 466.
46. For a discussion of the issues relating to the proper execution of the will, see supra
Part II.A.
47. In re Estate of Arrington, 365 S.W.3d at 469.
48. Id. at 468.
49. Id. at 468-69.
50. Id. at 468.
51. Le v. Nguyen, No. 14-11-00910-CV, 2012 WL 5266388 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).




56. Id. at *3.
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The trial court first admitted the December 1 will to probate but later
set aside the order and probated the December 31 will.57 The proponent
of the December 1 will then contested the December 31 will.58 After a
jury trial, the court found that the testator lacked testamentary capacity
when he executed the new will. 5 9 The proponent of the December 31 will
appealed. 60
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed. 61 The court made
a careful review of the conflicting evidence presented to the jury.6 2 The
court explained that there was "more than a scintilla of evidence support-
ing the jury's finding that [the testator] did not have testamentary capac-
ity," and that "the finding [was] not so contrary to the overwhelming
weight of evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." 63
4. Undue Influence
In re Estate of Sidranksy64 shows the importance for a contestant who
claims that a will was the product of undue influence to present evidence
at trial showing that the influence was actually exerted, because evidence
showing only susceptibility is insufficient to prevent a summary judgment.
The trial court conducted a bench trial and found that the testatrix had
testamentary capacity.65 The court then granted a summary judgment
motion that the testatrix was not subject to undue influence when she
executed her will.6 6
On appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals conducted a careful review of
the evidence and found that it did not raise "a genuine issue of material
fact on the existence and exertion of influence."67 The court stressed that
evidence showing that the testatrix was susceptible to undue influence
because of a weakened physical and mental condition did not constitute
evidence that any undue influence was actually exerted. 68 Accordingly,
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding its
opinion with the phrase "[m]ay she rest in peace." 69
57. Id. at *1.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *5.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at *7-8.
63. Id. at *8.
64. In re Estate of Sidransky, No. 08-10-00361-CV, 2012 WL 3363710 (Tex. App.-El
Paso Aug. 15, 2012, pet. denied).
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *5-7.
68. Id. at *6-7.




A. STANDING AND CAPACITY
The Houston First Court of Appeals has made it clear that a benefici-
ary has standing to intervene in an action if the petitioner's action would
result in a lessening of the beneficiary's share of the estate. In In re
O'Quinn, an alleged common-law wife claimed that the sole beneficiary
of the decedent's will lacked standing to assert claims for declaratory re-
lief, which included a request for a finding that no common law marriage
existed. 70 The court of appeals disagreed, explaining that the beneficiary
had a justiciable interest.71 If the alleged common law wife was successful
in proving a marriage, then the size of the estate passing to the benefici-
ary would be reduced. 72 In addition, Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§ 37.005(3) gives the court the ability to determine any question arising in
the administration of an estate.73
B. APPEAL
Each of the cases dealing with the ability of a losing party to appeal
during the Survey period applied the Crowson v. Wakeham test from the
1995 Texas Supreme Court opinion, which held that a lower court order is
appealable if the applicable statute (e.g., the Probate Code) declares the
order to be final, or is not appealable, but is rather interlocutory, "if there
is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be consid-
ered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise
issues or parties [that are] not disposed of."7 4
1. Summary Judgment
The El Paso Court of Appeals held in In re Estate of Coleman that an
order admitting a will to probate and opening an independent administra-
tion "is a final order that ended a phase of the probate proceedings."7 5
Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.76 The court of
appeals explained that although the executor named in the will had been
awarded summary judgment on all of the contestant's claims, and the
summary judgment eliminated all of the contestant's substantive chal-
lenges, "the summary judgment was not a final order because it left un-
resolved [the named executor's] requests to admit the will to probate,
issue letters testamentary, and appoint him as executor."77
70. In re O'Quinn, 355 S.W.3d 857, 860-61 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.
denied).
71. Id. at 865.
72. Id. at 864-65.
73. Id. at 866 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.005(3) (West 2008)).
74. Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).





2. Order Approving Account for Final Settlement and Authorizing
Distribution
In In re Estate of Scott, the trial court issued an order approving an
account for final settlement and authorizing the distribution of the es-
tate.78 The order also specified that additional steps were required before
the estate could be closed, such as distributing the estate pursuant to a
determination of heirship. 9 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that this
order was not final, and thus not appealable because the "order merely
set[] the stage for a further resolution of the proceeding."80
C. PAYMENT OF TAXES
An instrument must make a specific reference to the payment of the
generation-skipping transfer tax (GST tax); otherwise, the beneficiary of
a gift subject to the GST tax will be liable for it.81 The use of the term
"transfer taxes" is not specific enough.82 When a dispute arose regarding
whether the GST tax should be allocated against the residuary or against
the generation-skipping transfer, both the trial court and the San Antonio
Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Denman agreed that the GST tax
should be charged against the transfer itself.83
The beneficiary of the generation-skipping transfer claimed that a will
provision providing that "[a]ny transfer, estate, inheritance, succession
and other death taxes which shall become payable by reason of my
death . . . shall be paid out of my residuary estate" clearly expressed the
testator's intent that the gift pass without reduction for the GST tax trig-
gered by the gift.8 4 However, the residuary beneficiary pointed to Inter-
nal Revenue Code § 2603(b), which mandates that a generation-skipping
transfer bear the burden of the tax unless otherwise directed by a "spe-
cific reference to the [generation-skipping transfer]" in the will.8 5 The
court of appeals held that the will's reference to "transfer, estate, inheri-
tance, succession and other death taxes" was not a specific reference to
the GST tax, and thus the tax was allocated against the generation-skip-
ping transfer.86
In In re Estate of Denman, the beneficiary of the generation-skipping
transfer sought reimbursement of the GST tax paid from the estate, not-
ing that the court in the original case stated in a footnote that the issue of
reimbursement was not before the court.87 Both the trial court and the
78. In re Estate of Scott, 364 S.W.3d 926, 926 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2012, no pet.).
79. Id. at 927.
80. Id. at 928.
81. In re Estate of Denman, 270 S.W.3d 639, 646 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet.
denied) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 2603(b) (2006)).
82. Id. at 649.
83. Id. at 642, 649.
84. Id. at 645-46.
85. Id. at 647.
86. Id. at 645, 648.




San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the beneficiary of the genera-
tion-skipping transfer was not entitled to a reimbursement, or "grossing
up," of his devise to account for the GST tax.88 The court of appeals,
however, did not actually reach the merits of the beneficiary's claim and
instead determined that the statute of limitations had run. 8 9 Thus, the
primary lesson to be learned from this case may be that failure to bring
an action within the statute of limitations period precludes a claim even if
that claim may be meritorious.
D. ATrORNEY'S FEES
The El Paso Court of Appeals case of In re Estate of Anderegg90 ex-
plains that an executor who acts inappropriately and with notice that his
or her actions are wrong cannot later defend a removal action and expect
the estate to cover his or her attorney's fees. The executors were removed
from office for gross misconduct under Probate Code § 149C(a)(2), (5).91
The trial court refused to charge the estate for their attorney's fees in
defending the removal action. 92 The court of appeals affirmed because
the executors did not defend the action in good faith as is required before
the court can burden the estate with their attorney's fees under Probate
Code § 149C(c).93
The court reviewed the evidence and found that it was more than suffi-
cient to support a finding that the defense was in bad faith.94 For exam-
ple, the executors used a credit card they found in the decedent's safe to
charge their personal expenses even though they signed the court's writ-
ten instructions for executors, which specifically prohibited them from
"borrowing" money from the estate. 95 In addition, they continued to
make personal charges even after their attorney told them not to.9 6 One
of the executors even admitted that she knew her actions were wrong. 97
IV. TRUSTS
A. MANDATORY ARBITRATION PROVISION
The Texas Supreme Court held that arbitration clauses in trusts are
enforceable. In Rachal v. Reitz,98 a beneficiary brought suit asserting that
the trustee misappropriated trust property and failed to provide a proper
accounting.99 Because the settlor included a provision in his inter vivos
88. Id. at 147.
89. Id.
90. In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.).
91. Id. at 678; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(a)(2), (5) (West Supp. 2011).
92. In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d at 681.
93. Id. at 682-83 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(a)(2), (5)).
94. Id. at 681-83.
95. Id. at 682.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Rachal v. Reitz, No. 11-0708, 2013 WL 1859249 (Tex. May 3, 2013).
99. Id. at *1.
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trust requiring the beneficiaries to arbitrate any dispute with the trustees,
the trustee moved to compel arbitration.100
Both the trial and intermediate appellate courts held that this provision
was unenforceable.101 The appellate court explained that a person cannot
be compelled to arbitrate a dispute if the person did not agree to relin-
quish the person's ordinary right to litigate.102 The beneficiary is merely a
recipient of equitable title to property and not a party to the trust instru-
ment.103 A trust is a conveyance of property coupled with a split of legal
and equitable title and the imposition of fiduciary duties on the trustee. A
trust is not an agreement or contract.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration provi-
sion is enforceable against the beneficiaries for two reasons.104 First, the
court will enforce conditions the settlor attached to the gifts to carry out
the settlor's intent.105 The settlor included a clear statement that he
wanted all disputes to be arbitrated and thus the court will give effect to
that provision.106 Second, the Texas Arbitration Act requires the enforce-
ment of agreements to arbitrate.107 Even though the beneficiaries did not
expressly agree, they are deemed to have agreed through the doctrine of
"direct benefits estoppel" because they accepted benefits of the trust and
filed suit to enforce the terms of the trust. 08 These actions are the assent
required to form an enforceable arbitration agreement.109 If a beneficiary
is unhappy with the arbitration provision, the beneficiary may disclaim
under Trust Code § 112.010.110 The supreme court stated that "it would
be incongruent to allow a beneficiary to hold a trustee to the terms of the
trust but not hold the beneficiary to those same terms.""'
The opinion leaves open several issues. Although this was a trust case,
it would seem likely the supreme court would reach the same result if the
arbitration provision was contained in a will. The supreme court does not
discuss how to handle the situation where the beneficiaries are minors or
incompetent individuals. Arbitration provisions may become boilerplate
so that the justification that the settlor intentionally imposed the require-
ment may be problematic. Although beneficiaries do have the ability to
disclaim before accepting benefits, it is unlikely that beneficiaries read
the trust and seek legal advice about the consequences of accepting bene-
fits. Instead, beneficiaries just collect the benefits and study the trust in-
strument in detail only when something goes wrong. Perhaps a trustee
100. Id.
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *10.
105. Id. at *4.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *5.
109. Id.




will have a fiduciary duty to inform a beneficiary about an arbitration
provision before the beneficiary receives any benefits from the trust so
that the beneficiary has ample opportunity to disclaim.
B. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Wolfe v. Devon Energy Production Co.112 serves as a reminder of the
importance of properly documenting a trust in a written instrument that
complies with the statute of frauds." 3 In a highly complex set of facts
regarding the ownership of oil and gas properties, one of the claimants
attempted to demonstrate that the property was held in trust.114 Al-
though there was neither a trust instrument nor any document setting out
the terms of the trust, the claim was made that use of the word "trustee"
in a deed was sufficient to establish the existence of a trust.115 The Waco
Court of Appeals explained that when the term "trustee" is used in a
deed without more, the term "is merely a description and of no legal ef-
fect."" 6 The court likewise rejected a claim that a trust was nonetheless
created because the alleged trustee did not actually comply with the
terms of the alleged oral trust.117 However, the court recognized that
there was a fact issue with regard to whether a purchase-money resulting
trust existed.118
C. REVOCABILITY
In the San Antonio Court of Appeals case of Vela v. CRC Land Hold-
ings, the settlor created an inter vivos trust, conveyed property to that
trust by deed, and later removed one of the trust beneficiaries.1 9 After
the settlor's death, the remaining beneficiaries sought to partition the
property, but the removed beneficiary claimed that the trust was made
irrevocable when the settlor deeded property to the trust.120 The trial
court rejected this claim, and the appellate court affirmed.121
The court explained that under Texas law, an inter vivos trust is pre-
sumed revocable unless the trust expressly provides otherwise.122 Al-
though the removed beneficiary agreed with this rule of law, he claimed
that the settlor's deed of the property to the trust made the trust irrevoca-
ble because it used the term "forever" in the granting language.123 The
112. Wolfe v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 382 S.W.3d 434 (Tex. App.-Waco 2012, pet.
denied).
113. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.001 (West 2007).
114. Wolfe, 382 S.W.3d at 443-44.
115. Id. at 445. C
116. Id.
117. Id. at 446.
118. Id. at 453.
119. Vela v. GRC Land Holdings, Ltd, 383 S.W.3d 248, 249-50 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2012, no pet.).
120. Id. at 250.
121. Id. at 250, 253.
122. Id. at 252-53 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.051(a) (West 2007)).
123. Id. at 251.
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court held that this type of standard form language in a warranty deed
does not reflect an intent on the settlor's part to transform a revocable
trust into an irrevocable one.124
D. FUNDING WITH HOMESTEAD
Martinek Grain & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms, Inc.125 shows that trans-
fers to a trust of a homestead or other exempt property are unlikely to be
set aside as fraudulent transfers. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that
the transfer of property to a trust that was the settlors' undisputed home-
stead could not be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance because the
homestead is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law from the claims
of creditors.126
V. OTHER ISSUES
A. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR POSTHUMOUS CHILDREN
Under the United States Supreme Court opinion of Astrue v.
Capato,127 a posthumously conceived child of a Texas domiciliary has a
good chance of qualifying for Social Security survivors benefits. In that
case, a wife used her deceased husband's frozen sperm to create two chil-
dren through in vitro fertilization. 128 The children were born eighteen
months after the husband's death.129 The wife then attempted to obtain
Social Security survivors benefits for these children.130
The Court focused on 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), which states that the
determination of whether a person is a child for survivors benefits pur-
poses depends on whether that person would be an heir under the intes-
tacy law of the deceased parent's domiciliary state.131 Under the
applicable law (Florida), a child must be conceived before the decedent's
death to be an heir.'3 2 Thus, the Court held in a unanimous opinion that
these two children did not qualify for survivors benefits because concep-
tion occurred after the husband's death. 33 The Court did not address the
issue of whether the use of frozen embryos, rather than frozen sperm,
would allow the wife to successfully argue that conception occurred prior
to her husband's death.134
Texas Probate Code § 41(a) allows posthumous lineal descendants to
124. Id. at 252-53.
125. Martinek Grain & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms, Inc., 366 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2012, no pet.).
126. Id. at 805-06.
127. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
128. Id. at 2026.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2028 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006)).
132. Id. at 2026.




qualify as heirs.13 5 There is no express requirement of conception prior to
a parent's death.136 It is arguable that if this case had arisen in Texas, the
Texas courts would determine that these children were heirs and thus
would qualify for Social Security survivors benefits. Note, however, that
when the Texas statute was originally enacted in 1955,137 the possibility of
postmortem conception did not exist.
B. ANATOMICAL MATTERS
Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc.'38 demonstrates that a family
member unhappy with how a donee handles an anatomical gift will have
difficulty recovering on property-based claims. A daughter allowed an or-
gan donation charity to harvest her mother's tissues.139 The daughter as-
serts that the charity told her it would distribute the tissues on a nonprofit
basis.140 She claimed that her mother's estate was entitled to restitution
damages and that she suffered mental anguish because the charity trans-
ferred her mother's tissues to companies that sold them at a profit.141
After litigation with the charity's insurance carrier arose, the Texas Su-
preme Court accepted certified questions relating to the insurance cover-
age.1 42 In deciding that no coverage existed, the court made two
significant holdings.
First, the supreme court held that the daughter had at most a quasi-
property interest in her mother's tissues.143 The supreme court stated,
''we cannot say that tissues have attained the status of property of the
next of kin."144 It is true that the next of kin may donate a decedent's
organs, but they have no right to use those tissues unless the decedent
named one or more of them as donees.145
Second, the supreme court concluded that the mother's tissues were
not the property of her estate.146 A person's estate cannot designate a
donee under the Texas Anatomical Gift Act.14 7 Because the supreme
court "held that tissues are not the property of next of kin, [the supreme
court] necessarily conclude[d] that tissues are also not the property of the
estate."148
135. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 41(a) (West 2007).
136. See id.
137. Act of March 16, 1955, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 55, § 88, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 117.
138. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2012).




143. Id. at 385.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 387.
147. Id. at 386 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 692A.009(a) (West 2009)).
148. Id. at 387.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed in this article address a wide array of issues, some
very narrow and some with potentially broad impact. This article has al-
ready discussed the practical application of many of the cases. It is also
important to understand some overarching principles that transcend indi-
vidual cases and form a pattern. Here are some examples of patterns this
author detected:
Texas courts require strict compliance with will and trust formalities
and defer to the Texas legislature to establish such formalities.149
The issues of whether a testator had testamentary capacity or was un-
duly influenced continue to be the subjects of a significant number of will
contests. Because these issues are questions of fact, the appellate courts
give great deference to the trial court's determination. 15 0
Novel situations and cases of first impression are potentially of utmost
significance.15 '
A lawyer can avoid will and trust litigation with careful drafting, but
some disputes will arise simply because family members of the testator
are unhappy with the results.'5 2
149. In re Estate of Arrington, 365 S.W.3d 463, 466-67 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, no pet.) (court unwilling to add to statutory list of will requirements); Wolfe v. Devon
Energy Prod. Co., 382 S.W.3d 434, 444-45 (Tex. App.-Waco 2012, pet. denied) (compli-
ance with statute of frauds needed to create a trust).
150. See Arrington, 365 S.W.3d at 467 (upholding trial court's determination that testa-
tor had testamentary capacity); see also Le v. Nguyen, No. 14-11-00910-CV, 2012 WL
5266388, at *6, *8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2012, no pet.) (upholding trial
court's determination that testator lacked testamentary capacity); In re Estate of
Sidranksy, No. 08-10-00361-CV, 2012 WL 3363710, at *7 (Tex. App.-El Paso Aug. 15,
2012, pet. denied) (affirming trial court's judgment that testatrix was not subjected to un-
due influence).
151. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. granted) (en
banc) (whether beneficiaries are bound by a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust);
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026-27 (2012) (whether a posthumously conceived
child is entitled to Social Security survivor benefits); In re Estate of Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d
677, 679 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.) (whether a generic debt payment provision is
sufficient to alter the normal statutory abatement order).
152. Anderegg, 360 S.W.3d at 679-80 (inartful use of payment of debts provision al-
tered statutory abatement order); Nash v. Beckett, 365 S.W.3d 131, 133-36 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2012, pet. denied) (expertly drafted provisions subject to litigation).
